Behavioural standards in contracts and English contract law by Mitchell, Catherine
 
 
Behavioural standards in contracts and English
contract law
Mitchell, Catherine
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Mitchell, C 2016, 'Behavioural standards in contracts and English contract law', Journal of Contract Law, vol. 33,
pp. 234-253.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 1 
 
Behavioural Standards in Contracts and English Contract Law 
Catherine Mitchell* 
 
Abstract: Behavioural standards, that is, stipulations that parties will act according to principles of 
good faith, loyalty, trustworthiness and the like, appear regularly in commercial contracts. Contract 
law doesn’t appear to take them very seriously. Legal reticence over enforcement is understandable, 
given the difficulty of determining what the parties hope to achieve by including these provisions in 
their agreements. This article examines some aspects of behavioural standards and the contract law 
response to them. It suggests some reasons why contract law adopts a cautious approach to 
enforcement, and argues that, while often not appearing to create any kind of legal obligation, such 
provisions may play an important role in the interpretation of the agreement, particularly in what 
might broadly be identified as ‘relational’ contract settings.  
 
Introduction 
 
In Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd
1
 Leggatt J offered an account of when the law 
might imply a duty of good faith in commercial contracts. In justifying the implication, he emphasised 
some of the finer qualities necessary to make business relationships work:
 2
   
 
...a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on 
mutual trust and confidence  ...  expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the 
express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding and necessary 
to give business efficacy to the arrangements.  
 
While accepting that the role and scope of any implied term is sensitive to contract context, the Court 
of Appeal’s otherwise equivocal response to Yam Seng in Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a 
Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust
3
 indicates that English law still maintains no 
general good faith duty exists outside the categories of contractual relationship where the duty is 
established.
4
 This places responsibility squarely on the parties to contract for such duties, and this in 
turn invites an examination of how contract law responds to commercial parties’ attempts to render 
explicit in the contract the implicit qualities that Leggatt J describes. Surprisingly, and in contrast to 
the implied term of good faith, this phenomenon appears little scrutinised by contract law scholars. 
This may be because very few decisions turn on the operation of express stipulations of good faith and 
                                                     
*Reader in Private Law, Law School, University of Birmingham, UK.  
1
[2013] EWHC 111. 
2
[2013] EWHC 111 at [142]. See also D & G Cars v Essex Police [2015] EWHC 226; Bristol Ground School 
Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145.   
3
[2013] EWCA Civ 200; see also MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 
789 at [45]. 
4
Chiefly insurance contracts, partnerships and the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in the  
employment contract: Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20; 
[1997] UKHL 23.  
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the like, and they rarely come up for consideration by appellate courts. Alternatively, they may be 
thought to raise few issues of principle. Given its commitment to freedom of contract and party 
autonomy,
5
 English contract law should encounter little difficulty enforcing express terms to act in 
good faith or co-operate with a contracting partner during performance. Yet English law appears 
reluctant to accord these provisions much importance, tending to: (i) dismiss them on the basis that 
the parties’ dispute generally concerns the main performance obligations (specific and measurable 
outcomes from performance) to which the operation of the standard is irrelevant;
6
 (ii) dismiss them on 
the basis that ‘breach’ of the standard is subject only to informal social sanctioning rather than legal 
enforcement;
7
 or (iii) interpret them so restrictively that they are emptied of any significance as an 
attempt to oust the common law default of self-interested commercial dealing in favour of 
collaborative and co-operative models of contracting.
8
 
 With the aim of displacing this sceptical legal view, this article examines the use of what it 
calls ‘behavioural standards’ in contracts. The next section isolates the particular kind of behavioural 
standard with which the article is primarily concerned and examines the legal response to it. The third 
section considers English law’s difficulties with behavioural standards, dividing these broadly into 
matters of interpretation and matters of contract law principle. The fourth section considers how the 
law might accord greater significance to these standards in legal reasoning. It is suggested that, to the 
extent that behavioural standards are a response to the constraints on parties presented by the 
contracting environment, such as uncertainty and project complexity, there are some contracting 
contexts where the law should accord them greater significance, and should facilitate their use by 
developing coherent principles of interpretation and enforcement. 
  
Behavioural Standards and the Contract Law Response 
 
Contract terms that stipulate a quality to be demonstrated, rather than an outcome to be reached, come 
in many different forms and pursue different aims. They may operate as a protective measure for one 
party, giving grounds for termination if the other party’s behaviour does not meet the requisite 
standard. ‘Morals’ clauses in ‘talent’ contracts, for example, stipulate the conditions under which 
lucrative contracts for celebrity endorsement of products and so on, can be brought to an end if the 
celebrity transgresses.
9
 In a slightly different vein, parties may commit to deploying their ‘reasonable 
                                                     
5
 Values forcefully reasserted in three recent decisions from the UK Supreme Court: Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 
1619; [2015] UKSC 36; Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] 
3 WLR 1843; [2015] UKSC 72; Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2015] 3 WLR 1373; 
[2015] UKSC 67. 
6
 TSG Building Services v South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] BLR 484; [2013] EWHC 1151;  Mears Ltd v 
Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2015] EWHC 1396. 
7
 Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd
 
[2014] EWHC 752.     
8
 Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200.  
9
 See N B Kressler, ‘Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical Guide’ 
(2005) 29 Columbia J of Law and Arts 235.  
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endeavours’ or ‘due diligence’ towards the achievement of some outcome. ‘Endeavours’ provisions 
are generally intended to obviate the need for complete and final agreement on matters which lie 
outside the direct control of the parties or in circumstances where performance outcomes cannot be 
decided in advance with any certainty. A body of case law has developed in relation to these 
standards, and they are recognised as giving rise to enforceable obligations.
10
 While issues may arise 
concerning the relationship between a stipulated contractual objective, such as a completion date, and 
a diligence requirement,
11
 or what exactly a contractor must do to discharge an endeavours 
obligation,
12 
these terms tend to produce less of an interpretative difficulty than abstract statements of 
the expected spirit of performance, since the contract will usually identify a more precise outcome to 
which the endeavours and diligence obligations are directed. Courts recognise their general efficacy in 
creating at least some level of obligation in this respect, although identifying breach and the 
appropriate level of damages may be problematic.
13
  
 In contrast to the ‘morals’ clause or the ‘endeavours’ clause the function of more general 
behavioural terms in the business-to-business contract is less clear. It’s unlikely that the use of express 
duties of good faith and so on is directed towards policing the personal morals of individuals 
performing the agreement. More likely is that express duties of loyalty, or explicit requirements to 
display co-operative behaviour, are attempts to capture the spirit underlying the relationship between 
the parties that is expected to endure through performance. Another possibility is that these terms are 
not a reflection of an existing attitude towards the agreement and its performance, but are an attempt 
to encourage its development. The legal response to the use of these general standards varies. In line 
with the approach to endeavours obligations, if an express behavioural standard, such as good faith, is 
limited to the achievement of another specific contract objective then it is likely to be enforced. For 
example, a party’s decision-making power or discretion over some aspect of the contract may be 
required to meet a standard of ‘reasonableness’, ‘good faith’ or to be exercised in a ‘business-like’ 
manner.  Here the standard is not aspirational but functional in that it sets an objective constraint 
which limits the range of outcomes available to the decision-maker and which renders their decisions 
reviewable by a court.
14
 Likewise, contract terms stipulating that any outstanding contract matters will 
be determined by future negotiations conducted in good faith may be enforceable where the good faith 
standard is limited to the achievement of some other specific obligation in an otherwise enforceable 
                                                     
10
 Little v Courage Ltd (1995) 70 P & CR 469; P & O Property Holdings v Norwich Union Life Insurance 
(1994) 68 P & CR 261; Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 417.  
11
 SABIC UK Petrochemicals Ltd  v Punj Lloyd Ltd [2013] EWHC 2916. 
12
 Rhodia International Holdings Limited v Huntsman International LLC [2007] EWHC 292; Yewbelle Ltd v 
London Green Developments [2008] 1 P & CR 279; [2007] EWCA Civ 475; CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar 
Real Estate Investment Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 1535. See generally J W Carter, W Courtney and G Tolhurst, 
‘‘Reasonable Endeavours’ in Contract Construction’ (2014) 32 JCL 36 at 52; L Gorton ‘Best Efforts’ [2002] 
JBL 143 at 147. 
13
 Jet2.com [2012] EWCA Civ 417; Bristol Rovers (1883) Ltd v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd [2016] EWCA 
Civ 160. 
14
 Federal Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust v Federal Mogul Ltd and others [2014] EWHC 2002 at [120].  
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agreement.
15
 This contrasts with behavioural standards mandating that the other party satisfy certain 
abstract requirements of other-regarding behaviour,
16
 or that the commercial relationship will be 
underpinned by qualities of loyalty, co-operation and good faith. These appear much less likely to be 
legally enforceable.
 
 
Consider Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd.
17
 The agreement provided that 
‘...without prejudice to their other responsibilities under this Sub-Contract and their rights and 
liabilities under this Sub-Contract, the Parties agree...in carrying out their obligations under this Sub-
Contract, to have regard to the partnering principles set out in Annex A.’ The partnering principles 
stated that ‘[a]ll dealings between [the parties] will be open, honest, clear and reliable’ and that the 
parties would ‘[w]ork together to achieve a relationship of mutual respect and trust’.18 These 
principles were judged to carry no weight against a comprehensive set of excluding terms. The judge 
remarked, ‘[c]ommercial parties are entitled to and do rely on commercial “mores”; they can choose 
to rely on trust and to prefer not to expose themselves or each other to litigation in due course - for 
sound commercial and professional reasons’.19 The behavioural standards were dismissed as 
expressing only a ‘vision’20 that was crowded out by the hard terms.21 It is perhaps inevitable that in 
the context of a legal dispute, contract law favours enforcement of legal rights expressed with 
certainty over statements of aspiration, particularly if the agreement states the latter are subject to the 
former. But in circumstances where the behavioural standard clearly forms part of the binding 
contract to be read alongside other terms, the law still defaults to a restrictive interpretation of the 
standard.
22
 
 In Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd
23
  a complete clause stipulated that ‘PCC 
and [Ensign] shall deal fairly, in good faith and in mutual co-operation with one another and with 
Interested Parties.’ The judge held that this good faith standard obligated PCC only in relation to the 
discharge of its ‘best value’ duty, since the standard was located amidst other terms dealing with this 
requirement. The term did not give rise to a general obligation to maintain a standard of good faith 
across all aspects of  performance. This narrow interpretation defeated Ensign’s argument that the 
contract’s service failure points regime, which was the main issue of contention, had to be operated by 
                                                     
15
Obiter dicta in Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobas (No 3) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121; [2005] 
EWCA Civ 891. 
16
United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corporation of New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] 
NSWCA 177 at [74]. 
17
 [2014] EWHC 752.     
18
 See also clause 9.1 in the contract in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc and others [2013] EWHC 
2767 at [198]; Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen  [2007] EWHC 1330 at [33]. 
19
 [2014] EWHC 752 at [87]. 
20
 [2014] EWHC 752 at [141]. 
21
 See also Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200 at [154]; TSG Building Services [2013] BLR 484. 
22
 The trial judge and Court of Appeal differed on this issue in Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200 and 
[2012] EWHC 781.  
23
 [2015] EWHC 1969. 
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PCC fairly and in good faith.
24
 The narrow interpretation also resulted in the perverse conclusion that 
the express good faith requirement precisely prevented any wider application of co-operative 
principles to the agreement, since ‘if there was an overarching duty of mutual co-operation, it is at 
least arguable that such [specific good faith] provisions would not be necessary.’25  
 The formalistic approach adopted by the judge in Portsmouth demonstrates the difficulties 
faced in English law by parties seeking to create a contractual framework underpinned by standards of 
good faith and co-operation via the mechanism of express terms, and raises questions about the law’s 
capacity to facilitate collaborative contracting regimes. The remainder of the article confines 
discussion to the legal effectiveness of these abstract and general standards in contracts, and explores 
why English law is reluctant to enforce them. The most immediate difficulty is determining whether 
requirements of good faith, loyalty or trustworthiness are intended to be legally enforceable. But even 
if the standards pass a threshold test of enforceability by their inclusion in what look like binding 
contracts, there are related problems of giving such terms meaningful content, determining breach and 
remedy, and the problem of redundancy in the face of other express terms that stipulate more specific 
and certain obligations to achieve outcomes.  These are considered further in the next section. 
 
Why Are Behavioural Standards in Contracts Problematic? 
 
Legal reluctance to enforce general behavioural stipulations is understandable. A contract law that 
avows commitment to upholding the intentions of the parties may find it difficult to identify why 
parties include these provisions. Even the relational theory of contract, which brought into sharp focus 
the reality of co-operation in business dealing, sheds little light on why behavioural standards may be 
included in contract documents. Behavioural standards could be an attempt to render in formal terms 
the implicit expectations that underlie the commercial relationship.  But why would this be necessary 
if a relationship is already co-operative? And if it is not, can one really create trust and co-operation 
by including a contractual requirement to display these characteristics?
26
 Attempting to contract for 
values of loyalty, flexibility and trustworthiness may appear at best contrived, and at worst may empty 
co-operative behaviour of much of its value by interfering with its natural development.
27
   
 Legal reticence over enforcement may reflect party ambivalence over why behavioural 
standards are included in contracts, since it is not immediately obvious why contract law should seek 
to restrict their operation and interpretation. Contractual duties to act with reasonable care and skill 
will be implied by law, and good faith and honesty obligations have similarly been implied where the 
                                                     
24
 [2015] EWHC 1969 at [29] and [92-6]. 
25
 [2015] EWHC 1969 at [93].  
26D Campbell and D Harris ‘Flexibility in Long Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Cooperation’ 
(1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 166 at 173.  
27
Yam Seng [2013] EWHC 111 at [134-35]. See D Charny, ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships’ 
(1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 375 at 428; R E Scott, ‘The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract’ (2000) 
94 Northwestern University Law Review 847 at 852.   
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facts demand it.
28
 That express behavioural standards may pose a ‘process’ obligation rather than a 
‘result’ obligation cannot be an obstacle. Many contract and fringe doctrines are directly concerned 
with policing the behaviour of a party during the contractual relationship (economic duress, estoppel). 
Express terms may stipulate the standard or criteria according to which a contractual discretion is to 
be exercised. Courts encounter little difficulty in assessing whether the standard has been reached.
29
 In 
the absence of express stipulation, contract law uses implied terms to curb the arbitrary, capricious or 
irrational exercise of discretionary powers in contracts.
30
 All these areas demonstrate common law 
engagement with the question of what constitutes reasonable conduct on the part of a commercial 
contracting party, and clearly accept that contracting is a process underpinned by standards of 
behaviour.
31
 Yet it is also clear that English contract law has some difficulty with explicit behavioural 
standards in the contract scheme. There are many reasons for this, but two immediately suggest 
themselves: first, the problem of how to interpret the standard, and second, a more principled 
objection over the conflict between the values often expressed in the standard (such as loyalty and co-
operation) and the self-interested ethic that is thought to characterise commercial contract law. These 
matters are explored further below.   
  
Matters of Interpretation 
 
Are behavioural standards legally binding? 
 
The usual reason not to enforce a general behavioural standard is because the parties do not intend to 
be legally bound by it.
32
 The issue of legal enforceability is not clear-cut however. Empirical evidence 
suggests that amongst the business community, contract compliance means honouring both formal 
and informal obligations.
33
  Parties may therefore believe these commitments create obligations, even 
if this is legally questionable. The obvious way to ensure behavioural standards are not binding is to 
state this explicitly, or rank clauses as ‘subject to’ others.34 This is not conclusive however, since a 
court may decide that the parties have waived a ‘subject to’ provision through conduct35 and contract 
law often refuses to uphold written terms couched in seemingly unequivocal language in the light of 
                                                     
28
Yam Seng [2013] EWHC 111; D & G Cars [2015] EWHC 226 at [176].  
29
 Federal Mogul [2014] EWHC 2002.  
30
Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd and another [2015] 1 WLR 1661; [2015] UKSC 17; Socimer International Bank 
Ltd (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep 558; [2008] EWCA Civ 116. See 
generally R Hooley, ‘Controlling Contractual Discretion’ (2013) 72 CLJ 65 at 68ff. 
31
 See statement in Yam Seng [2013] EWHC 111 at [134-154].  
32
 Rose & Frank Co v Crompton Bros [1925] AC 445; Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] 4 All 
ER 713; [2008] UKHL 55. 
33
 B Burchell and F Wilkinson, ‘Trust, Business Relationships and the Contractual Environment’ (1997) 21 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 217 at 233.   
34
  ABB Ltd v Bam Nuttall Ltd [2013] EWHC 1983; Fujitsu [2014] EWHC 752.     
35
 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co KG (UK Productions) [2010] 1 WLR 753; 
[2010] UKSC 14; Reveille Independent LLC v Anotech International (UK) Limited [2016] EWCA Civ 443. 
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party behaviour.
36
 General statements concerning loyalty, partnership and so on appearing in 
memoranda of understanding, letters of intent, framework agreements, partnership charters and the 
like, may be interpreted as failing to create any contractual obligations because these instruments are 
intended to complement, rather than supplant, the formal contract structures.
37
 While these soft 
instruments may give rise to binding obligations depending on the facts and behaviour of the parties,
38
 
this tends to be exceptional. The legal view may be that a collaborative contractual arrangement is 
best effected through specific contract measures that emphasise mutual interest over individual 
contractor interest, such as profit- or work-sharing arrangements, joint governance frameworks, 
information exchange regimes and non-adversarial dispute resolution processes, rather than general 
statements concerning contractor attributes or the values expected to underpin the commercial 
relationship. 
  The restrictive approach to the operation of behavioural standards in contract law could be 
vindicated by two general findings about contracting behaviour emanating from the socio-legal 
literature. First, that in an ‘endgame’ situation where the commercial relationship is over, parties do 
not want their dispute resolved according to the norms that have informed their day-to-day conduct, 
but the strict legal obligations set out in the contract.
39
 Second, that ‘trust’ and ‘contract’ operate as 
substitute systems of norms, providing parties with a choice of governance regimes.
40
 A decision to 
adopt one precludes the operation of the other. While courts are well aware that flexible standards and 
expectations play a significant role facilitating contract performance, they recognise that ‘… parties to 
contracts often do things in the course of performance which is working well, which they might not 
strictly be obliged to do’.41 On this basis courts may be justified in regarding partnering charters and 
the like, which eschew strict apportioning of legal rights and obligations, as the antithesis of 
traditional formal contracting and thus not their concern.  
 These arguments may carry weight, but they are not conclusive. They fail to explain why the 
parties might seek to formalise their expectations about standards of behaviour in the first place. The 
inclusion of express behavioural standards requiring parties to act in good faith, be honest, reliable 
and so on, appears paradoxical to the line of thinking that poses an ‘either-or’ understanding of formal 
and informal contract governance regimes. Dismissal of these behavioural standards as mere contract 
                                                     
36
 Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA 396 (a ‘no oral variation’ clause 
did not prevent a variation by conduct).  
37
 Fujitsu [2014] EWHC 752. See J Rigby et al, Study on Voluntary Arrangements for Collaborative Working in 
the Field of Construction Services - Final Report Part 1: Main Report, (Brussels: European Commission DG 
Enterprise and Industry, 2009) at para 7.4ff. 
38
 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd  v Todd and Others [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 849; [2002] UKPC 
50.   
39
 L Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business 
Norms’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765 at1796ff.  
40
 C Mitchell, ‘Contracts and Contract Law: Challenging the Distinction between the ‘Real’ and ‘Paper’ Deal’ 
(2009) 29 OJLS 675 at 684-5.   
41
 Per Longmore LJ in Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357; [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1209 at [18].   
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‘window-dressing’ also appears misplaced. It is plausible to suggest that use of behavioural standards 
may reflect a genuine desire amongst parties to embrace more collaborative models of contract, 
particularly in sectors traditionally associated with a competitive and adversarial contracting model, 
where a ‘partnership’ attitude is not expected to develop spontaneously, and where a contractual 
framework for the relationship remains appropriate.
42
 Alternatively, use of such open-ended and 
flexible provisions may be a rational response to a high-risk project, or a contracting environment 
beset by economic uncertainty.
43
 A set of aspirations concerning the contractual relationship may be 
the best that can be achieved if project outcomes are innovative and complex, and where it is difficult 
to identify what, exactly, constitutes successful performance. In such contracting environments it may 
be thought beneficial that expectations of flexibility, compromise and co-operation are made manifest 
on the face of the documents. Difficulties remain over whether behavioural standards can be given 
meaningful content or whether they are too uncertain to be enforced. In part, this issue depends on the 
relationship between the formal express terms and the behavioural standards, in particular whether the 
behavioural standard produces an independently enforceable obligation separate to the other contract 
objectives. This is examined below.  
   
The relationship between the behavioural standard and the other contract terms 
 
When an express good faith duty is attached to the performance of another contractual obligation, the 
good faith requirement is generally limited to the pursuit of the linked objective.
44
 If the objective is 
achieved the good faith duty appears redundant. If the specific objective is not achieved, it is unlikely 
courts will interpret the behavioural standard as creating a separate and distinct obligation that 
generates an independent action for breach. There will be one breach – failure to achieve the specified 
outcome. Neither is it likely that any lapse in relation to a behavioural standard is regarded as an 
aggravating factor leading to a higher damages award for the breach (at least not in a business-to-
business agreement). On this interpretation, any express behavioural duty is discharged by performing 
the contract in its essential respects.
45
 This issue about breach is less clear cut in relation to general 
and independent behavioural standards which are intended to have overarching effect on the conduct 
of the agreement. Even if not directly tied to other contractual objectives, such standards will usually 
appear in the midst of other contract terms stipulating outcomes and expected results. Assuming the 
behavioural standard passes a threshold test of legal enforceability (it appears in the contractual 
                                                     
42
The UK construction industry has sought to embrace partnering and collaborative contract models, rather than 
traditional sub-contracting on lowest-price tendering models: see Rigby et al, above n 37; C Davis, ‘Alliance 
Thriving Post-Recession’ (2015) 26 Construction Law 26.    
43
 As in Jet2.com [2012] EWCA Civ 417.  
44
 See for example Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200. 
45
 Bristol Rovers [2016] EWCA Civ 160. 
 9 
 
documents without any ‘subject to’ or ranking provision), a question arises whether it carves out any 
additional obligations, and of what kind, to those appearing elsewhere in the contract.  
 Formal terms and behavioural standards could impose two severable obligations with breach 
of either giving rise to contractual remedies: the hard terms stipulate what is to be achieved, the 
general behavioural standard posits how it is to be achieved. Establishing separate and distinct 
obligations to achieve a result and to achieve it in a certain way is not straightforward however. 
Generally speaking, if breach of a performance obligation is established, the manner of breach - 
whether in good or bad faith -  is neither here nor there, since even ‘a deliberate contract breaker is 
guilty of no more than a breach of contract’.46 One may say the same thing about the manner of 
performance. If exact performance obligations are discharged, it may be difficult to contend that a 
party has nevertheless failed to act in accordance with any express obligation to act in good faith or to 
co-operate.
47
 In addition, it is unlikely that the exercise of  a formal contractual right will be held to 
breach the spirit of the agreement expressed elsewhere. It is well known that implied terms cannot 
contradict the express terms of an agreement, but even express standards of good faith are rarely 
allowed to moderate the exercise of what are interpreted as absolute contractual rights, such as an 
express right to terminate.
48
 One assumes the reason for this is to maintain certainty. Similarly, while 
it is entirely possible in principle to argue an independent behavioural standard has been breached by 
a shirking and unco-operative performance that nevertheless meets a specific objective, it is difficult 
to imagine a court assessing and awarding substantial damages for such a breach. The most 
appropriate sanction for a grudging performance may be the simple refusal to deal with that party 
again.   
 However, there are counter-arguments that can be made in favour of substantive and separate 
obligations. The law appears to have no difficulty in principle with terms that specify both a particular 
result and compliance with certain standards in achieving it. Granted, it may be difficult to determine 
whether breach has occurred if a contractor satisfies a contractual requirement to reach a standard of, 
say, reasonable care and skill, while not also achieving the specified result.
49
 Whether the overlapping 
obligations can be read together, create separate obligations, or whether one or other takes 
precedence, are matters of contextual interpretation of the agreement. In a comprehensive written 
agreement containing specific and verifiable obligations to achieve measurable outcomes, and that 
requires little everyday interaction or co-operation between parties, a court may be correct to interpret 
any behavioural standard as an irrelevance. In other contract contexts, such as long-term complex 
                                                     
46
 May LJ in Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1990] 1 QB 818 at 
894.  
47
 See Bristol Rovers [2016] EWCA Civ 160 at [98]; TSG Building Services [2013] BLR 484. Limited US 
authority suggests that a good faith obligation can form the basis of an independent cause of action even in the 
absence of another actionable breach of contract: P MacMahon, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an 
Underenforced Legal Norm’ (2015) 99 Minnesota Law Review 2051 at 2076-77. 
48
 Excalibur Ventures [2013] EWHC 2767 at [331]; TSG Building Services [2013] BLR 484.  
49
 Cf MT Hojgaard A/S v E.ON Climate and Renewables UK Robin Rigg East Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 407.  
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projects requiring reliable information flows, co-ordination of activities and personnel over lengthy 
periods, adherence to expressed behavioural standards may carry more weight. In these contexts, the 
behavioural standards may signal expectations concerning conduct that encourages dialogue, acts of 
reliance and investment in the relationship and project. Similarly, innovative and collaborative 
projects may be undertaken in uncertain economic environments not conducive to long-term 
contingency planning and risk allocation.
50
  In these environments, a claimant may well be able to 
establish that it is necessary for them to mandate that a certain attitude towards the project is 
developed and maintained. A requirement that participants put the project first to counteract short-
term and self-interested mindsets could be regarded as an outcome properly pursued through 
contractual mechanisms. Behavioural standards may therefore be necessary to accord practical or 
commercial coherence to an agreement.
51
  
 Understood in this way, the appearance of behavioural standards raises the question of what 
interests may properly be protected or advanced through the medium of contractual obligations.
52
 That 
someone perceives it is to their benefit to cultivate a certain attitude towards performance in a contract 
counterparty does not mean this end is best advanced through a contractual obligation enforceable in 
law. An assessment of the ‘legitimate interest of the contractor’ may determine what is permissible in 
this respect.
53
 In relation to the penalty rule, for example, the United Kingdom Supreme Court has 
recently recognised that a party may not be neutral between contact performance and damages for 
breach. A legitimate commercial interest may lie in seeking to encourage performance over breach, 
and to protect this interest through contract terms.
54
 Indeed in the penalty context the Supreme Court 
recognised that use of a liquidated damages clause may protect a party’s legitimate interest in  
maintaining the loyalty of the other contracting party by discouraging that party from breaching the 
agreement.
55
 Similar reasoning could be extended to behavioural standards. A behavioural standard 
should be enforceable as an independent contractual obligation if a contractor can establish that the 
standard  has a commercial justification or is necessary to protect and pursue a legitimate interest.    
  One such commercial justification may lie in the need to create and maintain a co-operative 
environment over the course of performance, particularly in long-term projects requiring on-going 
interaction between the parties in circumstances where they are required to react to shifting demands 
and priorities. Granted, one may not necessarily create the right mindset by writing duties of good 
                                                     
50
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 See the House of Lords in White and Carter (Councils) Limited v McGregor [1962] AC 413; and AG v Blake 
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54
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faith and co-operation into a contract, but formalisation does at least make the expectations 
transparent, and censure more justifiable, in the event  of a perceived failure to honour the standard. 
Some support for the separate enforceability of obligations of this kind occurs in SABIC v Punj Lloyd 
Ltd.
56
 The court had to consider the relationship between an express term stipulating a construction 
contract completion date and another requiring ‘due diligence’ in the performance of the works. The 
court regarded these as separate obligations: first, an absolute obligation to complete the works by the 
contract completion date and second, to proceed with due diligence (interpreted as ‘due industry, 
assiduousness, efficiency and expedition’57) in pursuing that objective.58 Although linked, the court 
held that breach of the first obligation would not automatically constitute breach of the second. The 
contract end date was an obligation to achieve a specific end and ‘due diligence’ was an obligation to 
make progress towards that end.
59
 Thus ‘due diligence’ was a flexible norm designed to set out 
expectations about how the parties would react to contingencies on daily basis in the light of the 
shifting priorities and constraints of the contract. Following this line of reasoning, two separable 
obligations could arise governing both the end objective of the contract and the continuing co-
operative behaviour necessary to achieve that end objective.  
  
Ascribing meaning to the standard: determining breach and loss 
 
Although it is possible to develop an argument in principle for the general enforceability of 
behavioural standards in some contexts, difficulties remain in ascribing the standards meaningful 
content, identifying breach and developing the appropriate remedies. In relation to these issues, there 
are two difficulties. The first is the problem of policing commercial contracting behaviour and 
identifying the limits on the pursuit of commercial self-interest. Judges are unlikely to encounter 
difficulty in conferring a meaning on behavioural standards that reflects what English law would 
imply in any case, such as duties to act honestly.
60
 A requirement to exhibit more nuanced forms of 
co-operative behaviour, such as disclosing relevant information, displaying loyalty towards a 
contracting partner or the project, raise more complex issues.  What good faith requires, for example 
is generally  regarded as flexible depending on the contract context. It can be interpreted as requiring 
only a very attenuated commitment to avoid forms of bad faith, such as fraud and dishonesty, to more 
expansive duties traditionally associated with fiduciary relationships. In the middle of this spectrum is 
the requirement that a party take some account of the other’s commercial interests during 
                                                     
56
 [2013] EWHC 2916. 
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 SABIC [2013] EWHC 2916 at [27]. 
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 SABIC [2013] EWHC 2916 at [24]. 
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60
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performance, but not necessarily to prioritise them.
61
 There are real difficulties here in scrutinising 
contractor conduct, and there is a clear danger of protracted and spurious arguments over what kind of 
behaviour crosses the line into breach of the standard. In response it may be conceded that these 
issues are difficult, but they are hardly novel for judges deciding contract cases. Judges are often 
required to interpret quite nebulous and open-ended obligations, such as a requirement to engage in 
‘friendly discussion’ as the first stage in dispute resolution.62 Similarly, day-to-day interactions 
between parties during performance may give courts a steer in animating vague provisions sufficiently 
to create enforceable obligations.
63
  Since this point touches on more principled concerns over the 
commercial contracting process, it is considered further in ‘Matters of Principle’ below.  
 The problem of determining whether commercial conduct has breached a behavioural 
standard is connected to the second difficulty of assessing compensation, and in particular the 
operation of the general rule that damages are not available for non-pecuniary loss following a breach 
of a commercial contract. Even if an independent obligation to observe a behavioural standard is 
established, there may be few circumstances where a commercial contractor can make out a financial 
loss resulting from breach, as opposed to losses characterised as disappointment, inconvenience or 
general aggravation. A plethora of considerations exist in this area of law, making the effective 
enforcement of behavioural standards not just a matter of interpreting what the standard requires, but 
weighing a range of legal and policy matters concerning what constitutes adequate and fair 
compensation for loss, remoteness of loss, avoiding gratuitous benefits through damages awards,
64
 
preventing overcompensation and the general denial of punitive awards. 
 While the rule about non-pecuniary loss raises a formidable obstacle to enforcement, it is not 
decisive. First, there are a range of remedial responses, apart from damages awards, that may be 
appropriate in the enforcement of behavioural standards. Persistent failure to maintain a behavioural 
standard could be regarded as a sufficient to justify termination of the contract by the other party, 
even in circumstances where completion of the specific performance obligations is still some way off. 
Second, in relation to damages it may be possible to evidence a financial loss from breach of a 
behavioural standard that delays progress towards contract completion.
65
 Some more specific 
behavioural duties  (information-sharing, for example) could be less problematic in this respect than 
duties to display attributes such as trust, loyalty and good faith. Even if legal enforcement is imperfect 
in the sense that damages are hard to quantify this feature would hardly be unusual in the law of 
contract damages. Consumer contracts are often concerned with securing intangibles such as 
                                                     
61
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pleasurable amenity, peace of mind or the achievement of the consumer’s idiosyncratic preferences. 
Contract law has conceded that substantial damages can follow from a contractor’s failure to furnish 
pleasure, freedom from distress and so on, if it was contract term to secure these states of mind,
66
 even 
though the approach to quantification of damages is necessarily ad hoc and awards rarely generous.
67
 
These claimants are generally unable to show any pecuniary losses flowing from breach however. 
There is the additional problem that in a commercial context breach may be endemic
68
 and 
commercial contractors expected to face it with equanimity.
69
 Given the possibility that a contractor is 
protecting a legitimate interest through use of behavioural standards this last point seems inapposite. 
If a contractor establishes that the standard has justifiably been made the subject of a primary 
performance obligation then they are entitled to some remedy if they suffer loss on breach. 
Difficulties of quantification of loss, or the common occurrence of breach, do not alter this. 
Ultimately, whether the claimant undertook an enforceable obligation to act in a particular way during 
the contract, and whether the claimant has been deprived of a contractual benefit from breach of the 
behavioural standard, are issues about interpretation. The courts have implied terms of co-operation
70
 
and good faith in long term agreements requiring day-to-day collaboration,
71
 and also in relation to 
how a discretion is exercised. There would be little point in implying such terms if they could not be 
supported by remedies.  
 
Matters of Principle 
 
Matters of interpretation raise barriers for the reception of behavioural standards into law. It is 
arguable that these barriers are largely surmountable by receptive courts paying close attention to 
contracting context. A more intractable set of difficulties are presented by commercial contract law’s 
institutional commitments.  That is to say, the broad principles and values displayed by general 
contract law in its regulation and facilitation of business contracting, and in its assumptions about the 
contracting process. The following is not intended to be an exhaustive account, but examines only 
those attitudes that contribute to explaining the law’s reticence towards the enforceability of 
behavioural standards.     
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Transforming the commercial relationship into a fiduciary one  
  
One vexed issue in relation to behavioural standards is whether these provisions can require a party to 
subordinate their own commercial interests to those of a contracting partner. This is doubtful, but  
behavioural standards, particularly ones couched in general terms of trust and co-operation, might be 
regarded as a suspicious attempt to impose fiduciary-type duties of loyalty on the parties to an arm’s 
length commercial agreement.  Precise wording of the standard is important here, and some terms 
may be interpreted as meaning a party is not entirely free to act solely in accordance with their own 
commercial interests without considering the effect on the other party.
72
 Nevertheless, the legal 
default is that ‘independently contracting parties do not undertake normally to subordinate their own 
commercial interests to another.’73 To the extent that behavioural standards are perceived as 
disrupting this legal expectation, courts may react to them with circumspection. 
 This wariness of allowing fiduciary values to intrude into arm’s length commercial dealing 
mirrors a similar reluctance to allow principles of equity to circumvent contractual rights.
74
 Concern is 
often expressed that equitable interventions will ‘distort the parties’ contractual bargain’75 or render 
the law and the exercise of contractual rights uncertain.
76
 Equity’s emphasis on good conscience as a 
standard appears opposed to the self-interested economic rationality that is often thought to suffuse 
the model of the commercial contractor underlying classical contract law.
77
 Whereas equity is 
concerned with standards of behaviour and unconscionability, the basis of the contractual obligation 
lies not in the observance of general standards, but in bargain.
78
 Contractual and fiduciary duties can 
exist in tandem, as with agents for example, but the duties under the contract are of a different 
character to those arising from a fiduciary relationship,
79
 and contract law values predominate. If the 
parties act under a contract that also has fiduciary duties, the fiduciary duties may be moulded to fit 
the contract terms,
80
 and crucially, any element of competition in the arrangements will prevent any 
fiduciary duties from arising.
81
    
 This particular objection to enforcing behavioural standards has little currency when the 
parties write such obligations into their agreement. It also overlooks that the role of the standard is to   
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indicate clearly that, while the parties may be using contractual mechanisms to pursue their project 
objectives, the untrammelled pursuit of self interest is circumscribed.
82
 The appearance of behavioural 
standards in contracts illustrates that a simple binary distinction cannot be maintained between 
commercial relationships characterised by self-regarding attitudes and those relationships 
characterised by other-regarding attitudes. This is particularly the case in long-term contracts such as 
joint ventures or distributorship agreements which, in their reliance on norms of both adversarial 
contracting and partnership, display mixed commitments in their choice of relationship governance. 
Unfortunately, there is a general reluctance on the part of contract law to engage with the distinct 
features of commercial relationships that occupy this extensive middle ground. The legal response to 
relational contracts exemplifies this.  
 
Legal reluctance to recognise the ‘relational contract’ 
 
While there is some halting recognition of relational contracts in judgments, there has been no 
sustained legal attempt to develop and apply to them an alternative style of contract law that responds 
to their distinct characteristics.
83
 Given that behavioural standards often appear in transacting contexts 
that one might associate with relational contracting - complex projects requiring a high level of day-
to-day interaction, reliable information-exchange and close co-operation between the parties – the 
unwillingness to accord much significance to behavioural standards reflects the more deep-seated 
legal reluctance to acknowledge that commercial contracts are not all the same. Despite recognising 
the significance of individual contract context, there seems to be little judicial appetite for developing 
a  set of coherent principles to deal with relational contracts nor the requisite criteria to determine 
when those principles will be applicable. This reluctance is driven primarily by the fear that it will 
result in legal uncertainty.   
 The phenomenon of parties writing relational-style duties of trust, loyalty and co-operation 
into their agreements confronts this legal reluctance directly, and makes it imperative for courts to 
engage with the idea of relational contracts. That said,  judicial scepticism that a party can create a 
relational contract out of thin air by the addition of behavioural duties of loyalty and co-operation is 
entirely justified. One might speculate that formalisation of behavioural standards within contract 
documents signifies a business relationship at the discrete end of the contract spectrum, rather than the 
relational end. This is borne out when one considers that new ‘partnering’ models of agreement often 
appear in traditionally contract-reliant, adversarial and dispute-ridden industries, such as 
                                                     
82
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construction.
84
 Of the many different transacting models that parties commit to, some eschew 
traditional contracting and sub-contracting in favour of various forms of alliancing and collaborative 
models.
85
 Naturally this development may be criticised as highly artificial, reposing excessive faith in 
contractual documents to mould expectations of the contractors along more co-operative lines. 
Nevertheless, while such models may rely on the formalisation of behavioural expectations to achieve 
their aims, to the extent that these collaborative models are a genuine attempt to introduce a paradigm-
shift away from discrete contracting to more co-operative forms of governance, then courts should 
develop doctrines and legal reasoning techniques that support this movement. There may be lessons 
here too for socio-legal and relational scholars. The phenomenon of the behavioural standard 
demonstrates that the simple divide into ‘relational’ and ‘discrete’ is too simplistic to capture the 
variety of governance techniques that commercial parties utilise in their contracts. It also complicates 
the debate about the relationship between legal and non-legal norms by denying that these stark 
alternatives exhaust the parties’ options for contract governance.  
 A further consideration is that behavioural standards are an attempt to contract around an 
English law default. Commercial contract law reflects a number of assumptions about the contracting 
process, chiefly that it involves discrete transactions conducted at arm’s length between antagonistic 
strangers.
86
 The written text (where one exists) is assumed to be the repository of all the parties’ 
obligations. Recent decisions from the UK Supreme Court have resiled from a broad contextualist 
approach to agreements, returning to a textualist, or at least minimal–contextualist, interpretative style 
which places primary focus on the words of the contract text.
87
 Those scholars and judges who 
support a more formal contract law often argue that parties requiring a different legal approach to 
their agreement can contract around this default and into contextualist and standards-based legal 
reasoning methods.
88
 Similarly, the legal response to the idea of relational contracts is to counsel 
parties to write agreements that reflect the relational aspects of their deal.
89
 Behavioural standards 
expressed in partnership charters and the like, could be regarded as an attempt to do exactly this - 
mould contract context and in the process render obsolete the debate about whether judges should use 
contextual or textual interpretation methods.  
 Conclusions about contracting around a formal default may also follow implicitly from some 
contracting contexts. While many transactions fit the discrete and adversarial model (or appear to fit 
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this model) it is also clear that many do not. Hybrid forms of arrangement that rely on norms of 
partnership, co-operation and alliancing may be used by relative strangers as part of an attempt to 
build an ongoing relationship of trust.
90
 These agreements may be underpinned by different 
expectations concerning a ‘moral contract’ rather than legal entitlement.91 In the wake of 
developments in outsourcing, vertical disintegration of firms and the advent of the network 
phenomenon, contracting forms are increasing in complexity.
92
 In these contexts, and in other long-
term commercial relationships involving repeated interactions between parties, there will often be 
multi-layered and multi-purpose documentation covering many different aspects of the arrangements, 
including both legal obligations, informal commitments and other essential information.
93
 In complex 
projects, given the requirement for reliable information exchange and to engage in a degree of 
relationship management and co-ordination, complete faith in governance by informal norms and 
sanctions is not feasible. But neither is discrete and legalistic contracting. Legal measures are not 
abandoned entirely, but the contracting environment may be mired in the kind of uncertainty and 
complexity which militates against comprehensive advanced planning.  At the very least, behavioural 
standards may have a placebo effect on the contractual relationship, drawing on the disciplining and 
symbolic power of the written document, quite irrespective of its enforceability, to channel contractor 
behaviour, as well as providing practical reassurance.
94
 Having a record of expectations provides a 
platform for negotiating difficult matters which only reveal themselves once the parties have 
embarked on performance, and which were not decided in advance.
95
 This kind of semi-contractual 
framework appears very different to the standard terms and conditions of a discrete sales agreement 
(or even a series of such agreements), familiar from the early empirical studies, which were 
exchanged (or not) and then filed away. That sort of agreement rarely requires ongoing co-operation. 
Thus the correct legal response to the use of the behavioural standard – whether they should be 
regarded as merely aspirational or as manifesting a more serious commitment -  depends on each 
individual contract and its context. This is explored further below. 
 
Giving Effect to the Behavioural Standard 
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It is unlikely that a uniform approach to the enforcement of behavioural standards can be mandated in 
advance. As such, contract law should develop an appropriate, context-led method that differentiates 
when direct enforcement of the standard may be appropriate and when it should be accorded a 
supporting role in the contract framework, notably as an interpretative criterion. A direct approach to 
enforcement can be seen in Berkeley Community Villages v Pullen.
96
 Here the judge interpreted an 
abstract good faith duty as creating ‘a contractual obligation to observe reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in accordance with their actions which related to the Agreement and also 
requiring faithfulness to the agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations 
of the...Claimant’.97 This interpretation denied the defendant a right to pursue certain forms of 
behaviour which, while not in contravention of any express stipulation in the agreement, nevertheless 
undermined its purpose and spirit. Alternatively, behavioural standards can be regarded as ‘organising 
principles’ informing the interpretation of other terms and the application of doctrine.98 
 Ultimately, whether behavioural standards can be taken seriously as creating obligations to 
behave in the prescribed manner depends upon the level of fit between the values expressed in the 
standards, the features of the project and the relationship of the parties. Of course formal references to 
legal rights such as termination, which appear unequivocal in tone and effect, may sit uneasily with 
references elsewhere to the parties displaying virtues of loyalty, flexibility and co-operation. There 
have been instances where courts have attempted to construct a coherent and consistent contract 
framework out of both the express behavioural standards and other rights and obligations by treating 
the standard as the interpretative criterion against which the harder terms are given meaning and 
effect. A systematic and principled approach to this has yet to be developed however, and any 
decision on the effectiveness of the good faith or co-operation clause in curtailing self-interested 
contractor behaviour mainly serves to add weight to an outcome justified on other legal grounds. 
Nevertheless, there are instances of courts adopting a suitably holistic approach to the agreement, 
seeking to bestow some significance on the behavioural standards. In Birse Construction Ltd v St 
Davids Ltd
99
 the court interpreted the existence of a ‘partnership charter’, in which the parties outlined 
in broad terms their expectation that they would proceed on the basis of ‘mutual co-operation and 
trust’, as preventing one party adopting a formal and legalistic attitude towards the creation of a 
contract. Berkeley Community Villages and Birse demonstrate the potential of the behavioural 
standard to allow courts to police commercial behaviour which may be characterised as opportunistic 
rather than dishonest, and over which the law may often be equivocal. Since these controlling 
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standards are found within the agreement itself, it is difficult to criticise this judicial scrutiny as an 
unacceptable interference with freedom of contract. 
 Outright inconsistency in terms remains a problem, particularly in multifaceted contract 
documents serving a variety of complex purposes. As with most things in contract, dealing with 
inconsistency requires the contract to be interpreted. The court must take an overview of the overall 
purpose and object of the contract, and to reject any contract provision which is inconsistent with this 
purpose.
100
  The relative weight of the contract terms in relation to the contract purpose, and in light of 
considerations of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘business common sense’, may also be material.101 Where 
parties commit to a general behavioural standard this may qualify the exercise of their ‘absolute’ 
contractual rights, rendering them non-absolute. Alternatively, applying a contextual interpretative 
approach one might infer that hard terms will take precedence over behavioural standards in particular 
contexts. A single good faith provision in a comprehensive document within an industry noted for a 
self-interested and adversarial attitude between participants of broadly equal bargaining power 
probably shouldn’t be taken that seriously as expressing a serious obligation. In Compass Medical 
Group for example the Court of Appeal was not prepared to admit that an express good faith clause 
could signal a change to the paradigm of self-interested dealing, it could only qualify the isolated and 
precise contractual commitment to which it was formally attached. One might speculate that despite 
the appearance of express references to good faith, little day-to-day co-operation between the parties 
was actually required, and that the Trust only exercised control over the outsourced operations 
through the ex post identification of failures, rather than ex ante daily management of the counter-
party’s activities. Indeed outsourcing is supposed to minimise the necessity for this close 
supervision.
102
 Similarly a relationship which can be categorised as ‘just selling’ may be assumed to 
be underpinned by a self-interested ethic.
103
 In these circumstances any good faith duty may well be 
discharged by performing the agreement according to its terms. Other contracting contexts involving 
complexity, the need for on-going co-operation and co-ordination of parties, uncertainty, and long-
term relationships, may well require an alternative approach where the behavioural standard has a 
more significance as a functional and meaningful undertaking.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the contract law response to the inclusion of behavioural standards in 
business contract documentation. There are many different forms of such standard and myriad reasons 
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why they may be included in contracts. Use of express behavioural standards does not entail that these 
are always legally enforceable, and the parties may be equivocal about their meaning and effect. It 
could be that behavioural standards do not reflect any genuine preference on the part of contractors 
for a different model of contracting. This seems unlikely however. Given the wide array of 
contracting forms available to parties, it is hard to conclude that the choice of a co-operative 
contracting model is the result of indifference or inattention, rather than deliberation and design. 
Given this, there are plausible reasons to suggest that these provisions should be taken more seriously 
by contract law. The current legal response of restrictive interpretation is in danger of undermining 
their role in the management of the contractual relationship and performance. Some reasons for legal 
reticence in enforcing these sorts of standard have been advanced. In addition, some strategies have 
been suggested for overcoming this reticence and attempting to give such provisions greater effect, at 
least in some contracting circumstances where these kinds of provision can be regarded as a rational 
response to uncertainty or other features of the contracting environment.   
